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‘From Flatland to Utopia at the fin de siècle: a leap of faith’ 
 
At the end of A Modern Utopia (1905), H. G. Wells locates the limitations of his vision in the 
dichotomy between individuality and totality. He apologises: ‘in that incongruity between 
great and individual inheres the incompatibility I could not resolve’.1 These are the perennial 
problems of any utopian project: how all-encompassing can a community grow while 
retaining a unity of part and whole? And how can we get to utopia when that leap requires 
mass co-operation? In the great surge of utopian writing that was produced during the fin de 
siècle, therefore, Edward Bellamy, William Morris and H. G. Wells among others imagined 
utopias that were global in scale, and located in the future.  
These writers made a radical shift in utopian thinking by drawing a historical 
trajectory between their own time and that of utopia: Bellamy’s Looking Backward, 2000–
1887 (1888) and Morris’s News from Nowhere (1890) are narrated from an imagined future, 
and Wells’s A Modern Utopia, though nominally set on a ‘distant planet’, is nonetheless 
preoccupied with how to make the transition from this world to that. Unlike the static and 
self-contained utopias of earlier writers (from Plato in the fourth century BCE and Thomas 
More in 1516 to Samuel Butler in 1872) these are dynamic societies, offered as aspirations 
for our – or at least their first readers’ – future. A contemporaneous text that might seem to 
have little in common with these ‘historical utopias’, therefore, is E. A. Abbott’s Flatland: A 
Romance of Many Dimensions (1884), set in an apparently two-dimensional world peopled 
by polygons. Flatland is also, however, a satire on the blinkered nature of Victorian society, 
and a reflection on the preconceptions that prevent us stepping beyond our everyday reality to 
a higher (utopian) plane.  
Flatland has been viewed primarily as an intriguing text in the history of science.
2
 In 
the wake of Einstein’s 1917 theory of General Relativity, a Nature article recognised it quite 
rightly as a valuable precursor in conceptualising time as a fourth dimension.
3
 However, if we 
return Flatland to its 1880s context, its ramifications go far beyond the mathematical sphere. 
It has received brief attention from scholars of Science Fiction and of Victorian culture: most 
notably, Rosemary Jann has traced its attempt to bring into alignment the faith in intangible 
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dimensions necessary for both scientific and religious practice.
4
 In this slim ‘romance’, 
influenced by the ‘scientific romances’ of Charles Howard Hinton, Abbott advocates both a 
‘natural Christianity’ informed by Higher Criticism, and the crucial principle that ‘scientific 
“reality” rest[s] no less upon a leap of faith.’5 In this article, I will show how closely its ideas 
and concerns, and even its means of transition between our world and the next, can bring into 
focus those of the specifically utopian texts being written alongside it at the fin de siècle. As 
this article will show, Flatland breaks the conventions of utopian narrative by removing the 
reader from the narrative plane – quite literally – and situating us instead in the ‘impossible’ 
third dimension. The leap of faith necessary for scientific or religious revelation is 
simultaneously invoked as the route to utopia.  
The notion of a collective ‘leap of faith’ sits in tension with any chronological account 
of utopian transition. It retreats from any logical step-by-step or evolutionary process, calling 
instead upon our non-rational, quasi-religious faculties. It can thus be seen as an evasive 
solution. On the other hand, as envisaged by the utopian writers of the fin de siècle, it is also 
the most difficult thing to initiate. As in Thomas Kuhn’s theory of the paradigm shift (1962), 
our inferences are constrained by the rules and expectations of the current version of ‘normal 
science’.6 Until the point of crisis, and the ensuing paradigm shift, we cannot conceive of any 
serious challenges to the current paradigm. This model demonstrates one of the most serious 
obstacles to the enactment of a utopian system: our persistent inability even to envisage the 
things that have not yet been discovered. This essay argues, therefore, for the leap of faith as 
both an evasion – an acknowledgement of ‘incompatibility’ – and these utopias’ greatest 
strength, since they allow for the agency of the reader to come into play, both imaginatively 
and in future activism.  
The relationship of utopian writing to practical action has long been a subject of 
debate.
7
 As Darko Suvin has pointed out, utopian studies encompasses two rather disparate 
groupings – social scientists whose focus is utopian communities, and literary scholars 
interested in utopia as text – making the field sometimes seem, in Suvin’s words, ‘a two-
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headed monster’.8 In this essay, I consider both monstrous heads together, analysing these 
texts both as literary fictions – with all the open-endedness celebrated by Ernst Bloch and 
those inspired by him – and as tools for change, which seek to lead the world of their 
readership towards real social transformation.
9
 First, I examine how these utopias negotiate 
fin-de-siècle debates about the relationship between individual and society, the particular and 
the general. Their stances on this question unsurprisingly raise more questions, the subject of 
Part II: how do you reconcile depersonalised, collective agency with the need for someone to 
start, lead and carry out the necessary revolutionary transformation? How do you create 
collectivity without its potential corollary: inertia? The answer they all turn to is a leap of 
faith. As I suggest in Part III, this might not be the deluded or hopeless response it first 
seems. 
 
I. Society and the ‘unhistoric’ individual 
Two different ideals of the relationship between individual and society jostled for position in 
the 1880s and 1890s. This drew on, and found expression in, biological debates of the 
previous two decades. While Hebert Spencer asserted that all progress was a development 
from ‘homogeneity ... to heterogeneity’, using so-called compound organisms as a model for 
society’s functioning, T. H. Huxley instead insisted that any organism needs a central nervous 
system.
10
 This mirrored debates in the economic sphere, between prevailing laissez-faire 
individualism and the state interventionism of New Liberalism. Socialist movements were no 
more united on the issue. As Regenia Gagnier has recently highlighted, these fin-de-siècle 
decades saw repeated avowals of Socialism in paradoxical tandem with avowals of extreme 
individualism, including Oscar Wilde’s famous 1891 declaration that ‘Socialism itself will be 
of value simply because it will lead to Individualism’.11  
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This tension between individual and mass visibly imbued – and fuelled – social 
reforming work. One of the largest such projects undertaken in Britain at the fin de siècle was 
Charles Booth’s mammoth study of poverty in London, written up with the eventual title of 
Life and Labour of the People in London (1889–1902), which Beatrice Webb was involved 
with as an assistant. Booth has been viewed by Gertrude Himmelfarb as the first to re-
evaluate poverty not as a perpetual given but as a social problem in itself, and one that should 
– and could – be eradicated.12 We might thus see his project as utopian in scope and aim. In 
common with the more conventionally utopian writing of the fin de siècle, it raises that 
perennial question about whether centralisation can be a means to individual expression. At 
the conclusion to his study, Booth drew up a series of proposals to deal with the extent of 
poverty he had discovered. He suggested that the best way to deal with the ‘very poor’, Class 
B, would be to remove them from the capitalist system, and take them under state 
supervision. In making this proposal, he admitted that he was working predominantly for the 
sake of the ‘respectable’ working poor, Classes C and D. He explains: ‘Class B … is du trop 
[sic]. The competition of B drags down C and D ... industrially we gain nothing from B.’13 
Flying in the face of his liberal instincts as a successful businessman, Booth famously 
concluded – in an echo of Wilde – that ‘Our Individualism fails because our Socialism is 
incomplete.’14 He advocated a highly centralised solution as a means to a contrary end. By 
granting agency to the State, and placing Class B under its control, therefore, Booth sought to 
protect the rest of society from the threat of uncontrollable Socialism.  
This tension – even contradiction – between means and ends permeates the 
intellectual culture of the period. Bellamy, Morris and Wells, however, repeatedly reject the 
kind of two-tier system advocated by Booth, and instead of apportioning centralisation and 
individualism to separate groups, divided by social class, they seek to draw a line of 
causation from the former to the latter. The starting-point for all three writers is a shake-up of 
the value-systems by which individuals are judged, at once developing an existing tradition 
that had been key to the nineteenth-century novel, and going far beyond it. Alex Woloch has 
proposed that in the novel genre, people – who we conventionally discuss as ‘characters’, but 
are encouraged to think of as ‘individuals’ – need to be seen in a ‘character-system’, where 
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what matters is their ‘relative position vis-à-vis other characters.’15 The realist novel suggests 
that even quite ordinary individuals can be valuable and have agency, but Woloch argues that 
the genre is ‘structurally destabilized ... by too many people … who are incompletely pulled 
into the narrative’, who cannot have the ‘character-space’ that we (or they) believe 
themselves to deserve.
16
 As Patrick Brantlinger and more recently John Plotz have 
highlighted, utopian fictions do not conform to this model, and Morris’s project in News from 
Nowhere, for example, is to ‘reject ... the logic of “character-space”’, and produce characters 
who are ‘systematically flat’.17 Nonetheless, as Plotz highlights, this involves rejecting ‘even 
the idea of minorness’, insisting instead on valorising ordinary individuals, subsuming and 
subordinating conventional notions of heroes.
18
  
These utopists all suggest that the relative ‘historic’ and ‘unhistoric’ status of 
individuals in our world is only the result of worldly circumstances, and would be entirely 
different in a utopian setting. They all take the philosophical position that circumstances can 
determine character as well as experience. This is one point at which their utopian socialism 
intersects with that earlier form of Robert Owen (1771–1858), who declared in his first 
published work, an ‘Essay on the Principle of the Formation of Character’ (1813), that judges 
and criminals only find themselves in this relationship as a result of their respective 
circumstances. If the former had had their upbringing ‘among the poor and profligate of St 
Giles’, they would doubtless ‘have already suffered imprisonment, transportation, or death’, 
and vice versa.
19
 Wells develops this type of hypothetical scenario in A Modern Utopia. 
Historicity is still a subject of concern, but historic status in our world does not match up with 
its utopian equivalent. Wells’s narrator asks rhetorically, 
What, for example, will Utopia do with Mr Roosevelt? … But, indeed, it is doubtful if 
we shall meet any of these doubles during our Utopian journey, or know them when 
we meet them. I doubt if anyone will be making the best of both these worlds. The 
great men in our still unexplored Utopia may be but village Hampdens in our own, and 
earthly goatherds and obscure illiterates sit here in the seats of the mighty.
20
 
The most obvious allusion here is to Thomas Gray’s Elegy Written in a Country Churchyard 
(1751), which imagines the graves holding men such as ‘some village-Hampden’, who might, 
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had circumstances been different, become historic figures. But this passage also contains 
echoes of the final sentence of George Eliot’s Middlemarch (1871-2), which states that ‘the 
growing good of the world is partly dependent on unhistoric acts ... [by those] who lived 
faithfully a hidden life, and rest in unvisited tombs’.21 This echo is further heightened in A 
Modern Utopia’s finale. Here, the narrator, having glimpsed a girl with ‘eyes that dream’ of 
high ideals, reflects that  
After all, after all, dispersed, hidden, disorganised, undiscovered, unsuspected even by 
themselves, the samurai of Utopia are in this world, the motives that are developed and 
organised there stir dumbly here and stifle in ten thousand futile hearts…22  
Just as Eliot uses the term ‘unhistoric’ to undermine its very meaning, these repeated 
adjectives of negation offer hope by implying their opposites. They evoke an entire 
mysterious world, whose ‘undiscovered’ status does not prevent it being real. Wells reveals 
his utopia’s Platonic roots in this gesture towards a realm of ideals that exists whether we 
have realised its existence or not. For Wells, as his narrator’s encounter with his own ‘better 
self’ demonstrates, a utopian character lies immanent within many of us, merely repressed by 
circumstances.
23
  
 Morris and Bellamy take similar positions in their utopias, proposing that 
circumstances determine character and even morality. In News from Nowhere, wise old man 
Hammond is outraged at time-traveller Guest’s suggestion that ‘political strife’ is inherent 
and inevitable, and ridicules the essentialist definition of ‘human nature’ it entails.24 
Expanding upon this paradigm, in Looking Backward, the minister Mr Barton comments, in 
his Sunday morning sermon, 
My friends, if you would see men again the beasts of prey they seemed in the 
nineteenth century, all you have to do is to restore the old social and industrial system, 
which taught them to view their natural prey in their fellow-men, and find their gain in 
the loss of others.
25
  
Rewriting Christian doctrine, he laments the struggles of poor misguided ‘ministers of 
religion’: ‘Looking on the inhuman spectacle of society, these worthy men bitterly bemoaned 
the depravity of human nature; as if angelic nature would not have been debauched in such a 
devil’s school!’26 The message is clear: their efforts are utterly in vain given society’s present 
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form; but it would only require a change of medium for human nature to be revealed in its 
true radiance.  
When Looking Backward’s protagonist Julian West returns (in a dream, as it turns 
out) to the Boston of 1887, he experiences a hallucination at once horrible and hopeful.  
[A]s I observed the wretched beings about me more closely, I perceived that they were 
all quite dead. Their bodies were so many living sepulchres. On each brutal brow was 
plainly written the hic jacet of a soul dead within.  
As I looked, horror struck, from one death’s head to another, I was affected by a 
singular hallucination. Like a wavering translucent spirit face superimposed upon each 
of these brutish masks I saw the ideal, the possible face that would have been the 
actual if mind and soul had lived.
27
 
This passage works through a series of successive reversals. Having taken the reader from 
utopia to reality, Bellamy now takes us from reality to horror and back, and again to utopia, 
in the space of a few lines. Returned to his readers’ own world, we expect to find ourselves 
somewhere familiar, but we are faced with a sudden revelation: we are in a charnel house. 
‘They were all quite dead’. From this lowest point of horror, we are then returned to reality, 
although one changed by utopian experience: it is ‘only’ their souls which are dead. From 
there, we are again offered a fleeting glimpse of utopia, in a Platonic ‘ideal ... spirit face’, the 
one they would have possessed had they lived in a transformed world. Of course, this pitiful 
vision does not last long within Looking Backward: at the nadir of despair, West awakes to 
find with relief that his return to the nineteenth century was merely a dream, and he is still in 
utopia. For us, however, there is one more reversal. We have to awake from the fiction of the 
novel, for his first readers to remember that they still live in the nineteenth century, and for us 
to remember that our civilisation still has not reached Bellamy’s state of harmony. It is in this 
final double reversal – for West, from horror to utopia, and for us, from horror to utopia and 
out again – that Bellamy situates his final impetus for concrete action. Individuals who barely 
fulfil the definition – as ‘so many living sepulchres’, they are utterly undifferentiated – could 
in utopia become people with a place in history. 
Each of these writers struggles in their respective utopia to reconcile the drive to 
diffuse historical agency more widely across society, with the concomitant desire to retain 
opportunities for individual freedom and diversity. In A Modern Utopia’s bracketing 
prologue and epilogue (as in the philosophical paper he added as an appendix), Wells insists 
that his utopia prioritises the fragmentary and individual.
28
 While in our society, ‘to behave 
“oddly” ... is to give offence and to incur hostility’, utopia will accept no discrimination 
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against eccentricity.
29
 The first inhabitant we meet is a dissident, who is free to agitate for an 
alternative way of life. Our narrator declares that ‘The State is for Individuals, the law is for 
freedoms, the world is for experiment, experience, and change: these are the fundamental 
beliefs upon which a modern Utopia must go.’30 This list of pairs holds an echo of Wilde’s – 
and Booth’s – notion of Socialism for Individualism: it is only a means to a contrary end. 
Even Wells’s order of the Samurai will eventually render itself meaningless. As Krishan 
Kumar characterises it, as Utopia develops and works its magic, ‘more and more people are 
fitted to join the samurai order. All citizens eventually will share in rule – or, to put the same 
point differently, there will no longer be a ruling class or elite.’31 In this framework, any 
hierarchy of historicity is eventually destined to disappear. There will ultimately be no ‘great 
men’, because there will be no downtrodden ones.  
In the content of his utopia, however, Wells’s vision comes across as extremely 
ordered and regulated, more concerned with categories and rules than with individuals. He 
insists that ‘no less than a planet will serve the purpose of a modern Utopia’: his state is 
insistently global, all-pervasive and all-encompassing.
32
 Our narrator’s companion, the 
‘botanist’, is the only persistent exception to this totality. While I. F. Clarke saw the character 
as ‘petulant’, ‘prejudiced’ and ‘deplorable’,33 it is more constructive to view him as a foil 
who highlights the flaws in the narrator’s schematic plan. As the botanist explains, ‘You 
mustn’t mind my saying it, but there’s something of the Gradgrind –’.34 Wells pre-empts his 
readers’ potential objections by interpolating his own self-criticisms. As Kumar suggests, 
Wells ‘insists ... that the scientifically planned and ordered world-state is an empty shell 
without a personal and individual life that matches it.’35 This is, however, difficult to put into 
practice. The utopia eventually collapses in a dispute between the pair, in which our narrator 
pronounces against the botanist’s valorisation of personal relations. The botanist ‘waves an 
unteachable destructive arm’, and ‘my Utopia rocks about me’.36 Whether this is a failing in 
the botanist or in the utopia, however, is debateable.  
 Morris’s stance on individual agency is more radical. In News from Nowhere, 
individual agency is meaningless outside its collective context. Although he represents the 
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transformation to utopia as enacted by working men, his narrative of events includes no 
named individuals: all the actions are those of massed groups of people. As John Crump 
reminds us, Morris’s view of ‘collective’ action follows that ‘encapsulated in the maxim of 
the International Working Men’s Association’, that, in Marx’s words, ‘the emancipation of 
the working class must be the act of the working class itself.’37 Change imposed from above 
can never by itself be sufficient. In fact, the only named individual in the entire chapter is 
‘one Gladstone, or Gladstein’, whose misidentification demonstrates just how unimportant 
individuated historicity is to this new civilisation. As Plotz emphasises, ‘Morris ... recoils 
against the notion that an investment in poignant particulars is the best avenue towards the 
universal.’38 Morris effectively challenges Woloch’s notion that characters can most clearly 
be understood in their ‘relative position vis-à-vis other characters’: the primary role of Dick, 
Clara and Boffin is as ‘representative’ utopians.39 They may have individual stories, but there 
is no tension between them, since their agency is entirely invested in the collective. 
 This, however, raises the question of how the transformation to utopia can be enacted. 
These future-based utopias all stumble at the question of how the change came; or rather, by 
whom did it come? In Morris’s earlier attempt at a quasi-utopian dream-vision, A Dream of 
John Ball (1886–87), the narrator encourages Ball to see beyond the imminent failure of the 
Peasants’ Revolt with a promise of ‘the change beyond the change’.40 Even in News from 
Nowhere, however, the chapter narrating the revolution is entitled simply ‘How the Change 
Came’, making transformation a depersonalised process with an agency of its own. In 
Looking Backward, the locus of historical agency is even less clear, as Bellamy turns 
revolution into evolution.  
A struggle, resulting in a still greater consolidation, ensued. ... the tendency toward 
monopolies, which had been so desperately and vainly resisted, was recognised at last, 
as a process which only needed to complete its logical evolution to open a golden 
future. ... The industry and commerce of the country ... were entrusted to a single 
syndicate representing the people. ... The nation, that is to say, organized as the one 
great business corporation in which all other corporations were absorbed.
41
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Jonathan Auerbach highlights the ‘passive voice constructions’ and ‘noun abstractions’ in 
this passage, which ‘seek to dispense with historical agency altogether’.42 Wells, meanwhile, 
never even attempts to describe how his utopia might have come about. Although he gestures 
cryptically to ‘turbulent times’ in its past, he also seems to imagine it as a parallel world with 
a mirror-image history, where ‘Jesus Christ had been born into a liberal and progressive 
Roman Empire’ (and thus was presumably not crucified?).43 That closing passage describing 
the utopia ‘just out of reach’, behind a veil, reinforces the notion of the utopia’s synchronic, 
rather than diachronic, existence, drawing on a Platonic eternal realm of ideal Forms. Wells’s 
emphasis on individuality and dissent acts as a critique of Platonic ideals, but his utopia 
nonetheless shares a great deal with Callipolis, most visibly in the ‘Samurai’, who Wells 
admits ‘reminded me more and more closely of that strange class of guardians which 
constitutes the essential substance of Plato’s Republic’.44 Even this order of ‘guardians’ is the 
result, not the initiator, of the utopian world. 
Matthew Beaumont characterises ‘utopian fiction’ as ‘dream[ing] that the diffusion of 
its ideas in the present will create the conditions necessary for instituting its ideal society in 
the future. In this way, it can conceive a revolutionary transformation by evolutionary 
means.’45 In this sense, utopian writing aims to facilitate a change that might otherwise seem 
impossible, by creating a bridge – both in terms of a practical model, and in inspiring new 
critiques – over the divide between existing and utopian society. In all three texts, the writers 
deliberately disperse agency in an attempt to make utopia fulfilling for everyone. Change 
only comes about when the time is right, they suggest, through a mass consciousness and 
collective desire, all pulling in the same direction. How can we reconcile this dispersion of 
agency, however, with its corollary: inertia?  
 
II. Collectivity and how to find it 
If a utopia is going to offer a model for present and future action, its writer needs to explain 
how their imaginary society came into being, in such a way that they can offer a template – or 
at least an inspiration – for their readers. In order to narrate the necessary transition from 
multifarious individual desires to a collective desire, and from that to an achievement of this 
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desire in utopia, fin-de-siècle writers end up reaching for a perhaps surprising motif: the leap 
of faith. 
 Incongruous though this might seem – especially in the case of avowed atheists 
Morris and Wells – it was a surprisingly common trope in fin-de-siècle idealist and quasi-
utopian social thinking. Beatrice Webb’s famous characterisation of the Victorian 
‘transference of the emotion of self-sacrificing service from God to man’ was applicable in a 
heightened sense, I would argue, in the closing decades of the century, when much social 
action came to be imbued with a sense of mission.
46
 This was not just undertaken in the 
service of religion, but as a religion in itself. Stephen Yeo has detailed the extent to which 
‘conversions’ to socialism were often seen as quasi-religious experiences, and reminds us that 
in the peroration to the Socialist League’s 1885 manifesto, Morris described his cause as the 
‘religion of Socialism’.47 More recently, Thomas M. Dixon has demonstrated how pervasive 
was the discourse of ‘altruism’, on the borderline between established religion and anti-
religious feeling, appropriable by both and claimed by both.
48
 This finds its epitome in 
Arnold Toynbee’s last lecture, given in 1883 in St Andrew’s Hall, Newman Street, London, 
and addressed in its final section to ‘the workmen’ present: 
You have to forgive us, for we have wronged you; we have sinned against you 
grievously – not knowing always; but still we have sinned, and let us confess it; but if 
you will forgive us – nay, whether you will forgive us or not – we will serve you, we 
will devote our lives to your service, and we cannot do more.
49
  
In this lecture, social work becomes more than a Christian religious mission: the locus of 
devotion is transferred from God to the working class itself. The rhetoric of remorse and 
forgiveness is directed at the poor, and the poor themselves are invested with the power to 
forgive and purify. In return, however, Toynbee calls for a reciprocal moral elevation: both 
classes are to find utopia together, in an ongoing spiral of ascendance. Transcendent 
religiosity is transmuted here into a socially inflected abstraction, the collective. This is, 
however, a difficult abstraction to create. It can only be achieved by a shift from dispersed, 
diffuse and contradictory desires, via a leap of faith into a singular and united vision. How do 
we make that leap? 
As we have seen, all these utopists reject (or at least recognise the impracticality of 
relying on) a hero-figure to initiate that much-needed change. Allowing people to rely on the 
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imminent appearance of a messiah is, in their view, a likely way to stymy any potential 
change. What is needed instead, they suggest, is a mass change of heart. This is where 
Abbott’s 1884 ‘Romance of Many Dimensions’, Flatland, can illuminate our discussion. This 
utopia, by the headmaster of the City of London School, shares a great deal with those 
already examined here. Its narratorial set-up is different, however, in one crucial way. It does 
not claim to be written by one of us, who has made an unexpected visit to utopia (as do 
Looking Backward, News from Nowhere and A Modern Utopia). Nor does it claim to be 
written in the future (as does Looking Backward). Instead of using temporal hindsight or a 
geographical remove to distance us from the action, it removes us from the narrative plane – 
quite literally – by situating us in the utopian dimension. Flatland is crucial for my analysis 
because it flips the paradigm. In this text, our world is, at least in relative terms, a utopia. As 
a result, it forms a dramatic attempt to get us to believe in the possibility of utopia. Since we 
are already in it without realising, there is no logical reason why we cannot push back our 
own illusory boundaries. If we look with pity and condescension on inhabitants of two 
dimensions (whether that be polygons or Plato’s cave-dwellers who think those 2D shadows 
are all there is), we should be able to make the leap to 4D. The fact that, despite its 
arguments, we do not make this leap, demonstrates the difficulty of changing fundamental 
assumptions and initiating wholesale social change. 
 While Looking Backward and News from Nowhere depict a successful leap of faith, 
Flatland is the story of its repeated failure. It reminds us, in a way that Morris and Wells only 
touch on via occasional dissident voices, of the painful extent of the overhaul necessary for a 
utopian transformation. Although the Circles of the High Council are repeatedly shown 
evidence of the third dimension on each ‘millennial commencement’, they deliberately ignore 
the evidence the Sphere places before their eyes. Enough of the structures and conventions of 
Flatland civilization would be lost, in such an overhaul, that fear as to its consequences 
repeatedly outweighs anticipation of its potential benefits.  
Flatland is in part a satire of contemporary Victorian society, and one which allows no 
space for individual agency or historicity, thus forestalling change. In this society, your sex 
and social position is utterly determined by geometry: the more sides you have (and the more 
regular they are), the higher your status. Geometrical shape, moreover, is passed down 
through heredity, and an absolute correlation is assumed between geometrical shape and 
moral character. Giving brief voice to the Owenite position championed by Bellamy, Morris 
and Wells, the Square admits that some  
13 
 
maintain that there is no necessary connection between geometrical and moral 
Irregularity. ‘The Irregular,’ they say, ‘is from his birth scouted by his own parents, 
derided by his brothers and sisters, and excluded from all posts of responsibility, trust, 
and useful activity. ... what wonder that human nature, even in the best and purest, is 
embittered and perverted by such surroundings!’50  
Our narrator and hero, the Square, responds to these dissensions with a po-faced 
reinforcement of the status quo, this time grounded on a doctrine surely derived from 
Benthamite utilitarianism:  
Doubtless, the life of an Irregular is hard; but the interests of the Greater Number 
require that it shall be hard. If a man with a triangular front and a polygonal back were 
allowed to exist and to propagate a still more Irregular posterity, what would become 
of the arts of life?
51
  
However, Abbott reveals these ‘arts of life’, so revered in Flatland, to be no more than an 
elaborate series of conventions and contrivances, primarily focused on establishing an 
individual’s number of sides via the most obscure, elaborate and difficult means possible, in a 
world which has wilfully refused either colour or height. If they opened their eyes to the third 
dimension, all the elaborate exclusivist paraphernalia of their society would be rendered 
meaningless. And this is precisely why they refuse to countenance it. Flatland demonstrates 
why a society might resist utopian transformation. Abbott’s acute social critique (pun 
intended) recognises that the potential for lowly isosceles triangles to beget an ‘Equilateral’ 
‘serve[s] as a most useful barrier against revolution from below’.52 Both the elite and the 
aspiring lower classes have invested too highly in the status quo to risk overthrowing it. 
What Flatland highlights, in a way that also applies to our other utopian texts, is the 
very religious quality of the faith needed to turn utopian vision into reality. It thus makes a 
mockery of the evolutionary trajectory Bellamy claims for the transition to utopia in Looking 
Backward, and expands upon the struggles Morris depicts as necessary in News from 
Nowhere. The revelation Flatland offers us is one which, although understandably ludicrous 
and mind-boggling to its inhabitants, we know to be undeniably true. Nonetheless, the 
revelation by the miraculous ‘Sphere’ is presented as the millenarian gospel of a messiah 
figure. When faced with the Square’s initial closed-minded suspicion, the Sphere laments, ‘I 
had hoped to find in you ... a fit apostle for the Gospel of the Three Dimensions, which I am 
allowed to preach once only in a thousand years: but now I know not how to convince you.’53 
As Jann has demonstrated, Abbott (like Henry Sidgwick, Frederick Myers and, at times, John 
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Tyndall) sought to reconcile scientific discovery and religious faith.
54
 Situating the Sphere’s 
message in the discourse of religion, Abbott begs the question: if this, which seems to defy 
sense, is evidently truth, why should the same not be the case with other such gospels 
(including those of Matthew, Mark, Luke and John)?  
Once the Square has been converted, he becomes a fundamentalist. He pushes the 
doctrine of Three Dimensions to its logical conclusion, which we are afraid to countenance, 
but which this zealous convert eagerly anticipates. When the Sphere dismisses ‘the land of 
Four Dimensions’ as ‘inconceivable’, the faithful Square replies: ‘Not inconceivable, my 
Lord, to me, and therefore still less inconceivable to my Master.’ He concludes, ‘And that it 
must exist my Lord himself has taught me. Or can he have forgotten what he himself 
imparted to his servant?’55 As Simon James has emphasised, by the late nineteenth century 
the fourth dimension was widely conceived as time, and so ‘this geometry of Four 
Dimensions’ fuels Wells’s Time Machine, and all the time travellers of our historically 
situated utopias, as well as Flatland.
56
 This exchange between Sphere and Square forces 
Abbott’s readers – living in an insistently three-dimensional world – into precisely the 
position the Square had previously held. Unlike him, however, we fall at the crucial hurdle. 
When it comes to pushing the boundaries of the status quo, we revert to blind creatures, 
fearful of what we do not know and cannot conceptualise.  
The implication of Abbott’s text, therefore, is that just because something is 
inconceivable to us, that does not inevitably make it false. As Jann characterises it, science as 
well as religion obliges us to adjust our rationality to ‘the illusoriness of the seen and the 
reality of the unseen.’57 Just because we can barely envisage the consequence of a social 
transformation, that doesn’t mean we shouldn’t take that leap of faith and make it happen. 
Abbott mocks the complacent reader, who thinks the world can only ever consist of the things 
he can hold within his limited mind, by transporting the Square in a dream to ‘Pointland, the 
Abyss of No dimensions.’ Its solitary inhabitant, as the Sphere explains, has no ‘thought of 
Plurality; for he is himself his One and All, being really Nothing. Yet mark his perfect self-
contentment, and hence learn this lesson, that to be self-contented is to be vile and ignorant, 
and that to aspire is better than to be blindly and impotently happy.’58 Abbott thus reveals, 
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more specifically than Bellamy, Morris or Wells, but with similar intention, the proximate 
and tangled relationship between attaining collective action and attaining religious faith. Both 
rely on a trust in something that cannot be proved, merely desired. 
 As Abbott highlights, attachment to the status quo, even one patently in need of 
overhaul, is a problem that all these utopists have to face. Even Bellamy, the one writer who 
asserts a smooth evolutionary trajectory between contemporary and utopian society, 
occasionally confronts this problem. At the opening of his sequel to Looking Backward, 
Equality (1897), Julian West’s new fiancée Edith muses,  
Suppose you had gone forth just as you did in your dream, and had passed up and 
down telling men of the terrible folly and wickedness of their way of life and how 
much nobler and happier a way there was. Just think what good you might have done, 
how you might have helped people in those days when they needed help so much.
59
 
What Edith fails to recognise, however, with the naivety of the native of utopia, is that they 
would have dismissed him as mad. Indeed, that is precisely what happens when West does 
return to the Boston of the nineteenth century (in a dream, as it turns out) and attempts to 
open the eyes of his peers to the fatal flaws of their society.  
When I had expected now surely the faces around me to light up with emotions akin to 
mine, they grew ever more dark, angry, and scornful. ... ‘Madman!’ ‘Pestilent fellow!’ 
‘Fanatic!’ ‘Enemy of society!’ were some of their cries ... .60  
As Jean Pfaelzer has delineated, even though ‘ostensibly the book ends happily’ (West wakes 
up in the year 2000 and discovers that his return to 1887 was only a dream), ‘within the text, 
the experiment has failed’, and ‘Julian is powerless’, unable to convince those who hold the 
reins of power in late-nineteenth-century Boston that anything could ever be otherwise.
61
 In 
these texts, the prophets of utopia – the Square, Julian West, William Guest, Wells’s narrator 
– are actually relatively powerless once they return to their present.  
Bellamy’s text is weakened by his failure to credit these voices with anything other 
than selfishness. In Wells’s A Modern Utopia, the fear factor involved in preventing the 
necessary leap of faith is more effectively incorporated. Unlike Bellamy, he both calls for a 
leap of faith, and recognises its near impossibility. In the passage already quoted earlier in 
this chapter, he declares that  
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After all, after all, dispersed, hidden, disorganised, undiscovered, unsuspected even by 
themselves, the samurai of Utopia are in this world, the motives that are developed and 
organised there stir dumbly here and stifle in ten thousand futile hearts ... .
62
 
While earlier I focused on the echoes here of George Eliot’s term ‘unhistoric’, offering hope 
of the Samurai’s existence, it is also important to draw attention to the repression all-too 
present in this statement. Not only are the utopian impulses ‘dumb’, but they are immediately 
‘stifled’ by the very people who possess them, eventually proving ‘futile’. Most tellingly of 
all, Wells presents his narrator as subject to the same selfish and world-weary habits that 
contribute to the prevention of Utopia. A ‘pinched and dirty little girl’ tries ‘pitifully’ to sell 
him a penny bunch of violets, but ‘“No!” I say curtly, hardening my heart.’63 He thus falls 
into his own trap, preventing Utopia from coming to fruition just as much as anybody else. 
As he comes to recognise, ‘the Strand, and Charing Cross corner, and Whitehall, and the 
great multitude of people ... is apt to look a world altogether too formidable. It has a glare, it 
has a tumult and vigour that shouts one down.’64 On the other hand, so did Utopia. Once he 
and the botanist were immersed in that world, they could not resist becoming part of it. The 
narrator comments that although ‘I had always imagined myself as standing outside the 
general machinery of the State – in the distinguished visitors’ gallery, as it were’, Utopia ‘is 
swallowing me up’.65 Towards the end of the book, he declares:  
Indeed Will is stronger than Fact, it can mould and overcome Fact. But this world has 
still to discover its will, it is a world that slumbers inertly, and all this roar and 
pulsation of life is no more than its heavy breathing. … My mind runs on to the 
thought of an awakening.
66
 
 Despite all the inertia acting to the contrary, he refuses to lose hope of harnessing this ‘will’ 
and using it as a force for transformation.  
 
III. Action beyond reading  
This leap of faith does not, however, have to be taken blind, or cut off from creative agency. 
Suvin has argued that there are two branches of utopian thought: ‘closed’ and ‘open’. The 
latter is most valuable to the reader, because it acknowledges its own provisionality, and 
recognises its own subsequent supersession. He suggests that ‘if utopia is, philosophically, a 
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method rather than a state it cannot be realized or not realized – it can only be applied.’67 He 
ultimately characterised utopia as ‘a method camouflaging as a state: the state of affairs is a 
signifier revealing the presence of a semiotic process of signification which induces in the 
reader’s imagination the signified of a possible world, not necessarily identical with the 
signifier.’68 The utopian worlds discussed here – from nationalised Boston to Nowhere, from 
a planet beyond Sirius to an immanent fourth dimension – are all self-confessedly personal 
visions. They may have an instrumental value, but they present themselves as exemplars 
rather than blueprints: they are the specific ideal only of their creator.  
Wells epitomises this most explicitly, voicing the hope that ‘surely, in the end’, 
Utopia will come to fruition.  
First here, then there, single men and then groups of men will fall into line – not indeed 
with my poor faulty hesitating suggestions – but with a great and comprehensive plan 
wrought out by many minds and in many tongues. It is just because my plan is faulty, 
because it mis-states so much, and omits so much, that they do not now fall in. It will 
not be like my dream, the world that is coming. My dream is just my own poor dream, 
the thing sufficient for me.
69
  
He suggests that the fundamental reason why his ‘modern utopia’ has not come into being is 
‘because my plan is faulty’: because it is ‘just my own poor dream’. Calling on the kind of 
collective leap of faith we have charted here, he suggests that transition from solitary utopian 
visions to a joint vision is the vital step required to bring it to fruition. Readers from Morris 
himself onwards have viewed News from Nowhere as similarly personal.
70
 Marcus Waithe 
has even argued for ‘the limited nature of Nowhere’s openness’, since Morris excludes ‘what 
displeases him’.71 Morris’s experience of factionalist struggles within the Socialist League – 
eventually tearing it apart – made him all the more reliant on a leap of faith to escape these 
petty disagreements and reach a collective goal. They also, however, made him all the more 
aware of the variety of individuals’ ‘dreams’. His utopia is designed to inspire its readers with 
‘visions’ of their own, as much as to persuade them of the validity of his own.72  
Only Bellamy’s utopia does not fit this paradigm. By ‘awaking’ in the nineteenth 
century, only to be followed by a ‘re-awakening’ in the twenty-first, Bellamy refuses us the 
right to view his vision in the personal framework that Morris’s ‘dream’ mode offers us. His 
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utopia is the least ‘open’, in Suvin’s terms. Ironically, this enabled it to have the most 
instantaneous and direct political impact. Looking Backward partly inspired the foundation of 
the People’s Party in 1891, which wielded some substantial influence before partially 
merging with the Democrats in 1896, and thereafter losing steam. On the other hand, this 
makes Bellamy’s vision the least long-lasting, and offers us now the least utopian inspiration.  
Perhaps, therefore, in reading a utopia, our desire for its enactment is generated in 
proportion to its unavailability. Wells’s Modern Utopia was been more attractive to its first 
readers than it is now to us, especially in the aftermath of cataclysmic wars enabled and 
facilitated by the very technology he so zealously imagines. Perhaps part of the reason why, 
for us now, Morris’s utopia is so much more evocative than Wells’s, is the power of the ‘not 
yet’, in Bloch’s terms: it has not yet happened.73 It thus retains an element of mystique, 
whereas many of the technological, practical and bureaucratic elements of Wells’s utopia 
have since come into being. The overall structure that enabled these thus holds less attraction. 
By contrast, Morris’s world still seems at least as out of reach as it did in 1890, so it retains 
its power to bewitch. 
So how can we get to utopia? All these writers suggest we need a quasi-religious 
conversion to enable a collective leap of faith: one effected in part, they hope, by their visions 
of a historically located, future utopia. They acknowledge the enormous and daunting scale of 
the paradigm shift necessary for such a leap. Flatland in particular, by situating the reader in 
a utopian dimension, at the same time as holding up a mirror to the dystopian elements in 
human society, makes us reflect upon our own limits of imagination. All these writers defy 
the clash of means and ends inherent in Booth’s or Wilde’s ‘Socialism [for] Individualism’. If 
society is motivated by a collective desire, collective action and collective agency are 
fulfilling both at the general and the particular level. Or, to put it another way, that distinction 
no longer exists. 
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